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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
DEL MONTE CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T~ INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFF 
* * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15218 
This is a review of the decision of the Industrial Com-
mission awarding increased permanent partial disability benefits 
in a Workmen 1 s Compensation case. 
DISPOSITION BY THE COMMISSION 
The Commission made an award on March 29, 1977, to one 
'.hlford J. Moore of Ogden, Utah, of 62.4 weeks of compensation at 
Sixty Two Dollars ($62 .00) per week, based on a finding by the 
:'lsability Rating Board on March 19, 1977, that Moore 1 s disability 
1 
ad increased from ten percent (10%) to twenty percent (20"/o) after 
- 1 -
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an on-the-job injury on March 28, 1968 and an initial award b; 
the Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Del Monte Corporation, the self insured employer seeks 
reversal of the Commission's determination to make the subsoqu 
award and the amount thereof. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wilford J. Moore injured his back on March 20, 1968, .... 1 
employed by Plaintiff when he fell from a railroad car to the 
ground. 
Plaintiff, a self insured carrier, after Moore had u~ 
gone disc surgery in January of 1971, and after a medical pam 
was convened to determine the extent of his injury, paid the s 
of One Thousand Two Hundred Forty Dollars (1,240.00) for perm2 
partial disability. This award was computed on the basis of' 
Two Dollars ($62.00) per week for twenty (20) weeks and was b2 
upon a finding by the Board of ten percent (10"/o) permanent pal 
disability. The order of the Commission was entered Septembei 
1971. Plaintiff also paid temporary total disability payment! 
and the medical and hospital charges attributable to this inc 
Moore returned to work six (6) weeks after surgery am 
limited to light work; however, he subsequently lr>ft thE' Gmpl! 
of Del Monte. 
- 2 -
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In 1974, he twisted h1s back again, apparently while hunting. 
or. James Hauser, his surgeon, performed further disc surgery 
in May of 1975 after myelogram studies in March of 1975 indicated 
the need for further surgery. Plaintiff paid for this additional 
procedure. Moore was released for work on June 18, 1975, subject 
to a limitation as to heavy lifting. 
On November 20, 1975, Moore filed his application with 
the Commission for additional permanent partial compensation. 
Plaintiff rejected payment of any additional permanent partial 
benefits because of the lapse of time involved but agreed to let 
a medical disability rating panel examine Moore to determine the 
then extent of his disability, if any. The matter at that time 
\vas before the Administrative Law Judge for a determination as to 
the statute of limitations question, and it remained dormant for 
some period of time. 
The panel finally on March 19, 1977, found Moore to have 
a present disability of twenty percent (20%). The Commission 
then, summarily, and without having the legal question decided, 
made the award complained of with credit for amounts previously 
paid. 
A Motion for review was made but summarily denied by the 
CoJ1un iss ion. 
- 3 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ADDITIONAL AWARD IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
At the time of Mr. Moore's initial injury, the Statu~ 
35-l-66 UCA 1953, dealing with permanent partial disability ben'· 
fits provided as follows, in part: (Laws 1967, Ch. 65) 
"Where the injury causes partial disability for 
work, the employee shall receive during such disa-
bility and for a period of not to exceed six (6) 
years from the date of the injury, a weekly com-
pensation equal to sixty percent (6~/o) of the 
difference between his average weekly wages be-
fore the accident and the weekly wages he is able 
to earn thereafter, but not more than Forty-Four 
Dollars ($44.00) per week, and in addition thereto 
Three and 60/100 Dollars ($3.60) for a dependent 
wife and Three and 60/100 Dollars ($3.60) for each 
dependent minor child under the age of eighteen (18) 
years, up to and including four (4), or a maximum 
of Sixty-Two Dollars ($62.00) per week in the case 
of a dependent wife and four (4) or more such depen-
dent minor children. • • • • 
The for~going is the statute to be applied in this ca~ 
since it was in force at the time of the initial injury. This 
court has so held in Utah Road Commission v. Industrial Comroi~ 
109 U 553, 168 P. 2d 319, and Smith v. The Industrial Commis~ 
549 P. 2d 448. 
The law as it now reads would allow benefits for not tc 
exceed Three Hundred Twelve (312) weeks, ovPr a period not to 
ceed Eight (8) years, if the application is filed prior to cic 
- 4 -
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years (Laws 1973, Ch. 67). The Commission in behalf of Mr. Moore 
obviously sought to avail itself of the eight (B) year period 
since the six (6) year period had expired. This 1973 enactment 
does not operate retroactively by any of its terms. The limita-
tion period and the extent of the benefits are changed therein as 
they have been about every two years in the last decade. Thus, 
our statute on prospective operation, Section 68-3-3, U.C.A. 1953, 
~uld apply, together with the rule against retroactive operation 
as noted in the following cases of this Court: McCarry v. Utah 
State Teacher's Retirement Board, 111 U. 251, 177 P. 2d 725; 
Oklund Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 520 P. 2d 
208. See also Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P. 2d 799 and Day 
and Night Heating Company v. Ruff, 19 U. 2d 412, 432 P. 2d 43, 
both of which are limitation cases. These latter two cases were 
concerned with shortening statutes of limitation. This was sanc-
tioned because the new enactments provided for a reasonable time 
within which to commence suit, but we note more specifically that 
this Court there adhered to the pronouncement that amendments to 
statut~s of limitation usually are not retroactive and should not 
be used to extend or expand the rights of claimants. 
Plaintiff contends that Wilford J. Moore had six (6) years 
from the dat"' of his initial injury on March 20, 1968, within which 
to "PPly for and obtain permanent partial disability payments. 
- 5 -
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This he did in 1971. His attempt to do so again pursuant to hi 
NovembPr 1975 application comes too late since the six (6) year 
statute had run. 
Two cases decided by this Court appear to sustain Plair.· 
tiffs position. U.S. Smelting and Refining Company v. Nielsen, 
19 u. 2d 239, 430 P. 2d 162, involved a claimant who sustained, 
knee injury in 1952 and, thereafter, r,oquested a lump sum settl'· 
ment after receiving payments for a period of time for partial 
disability. His injury reasserted itself afterwards and he in· 
curred surgery in 1965. This Court held that the six year staL 
of limitations barred any further permanent partial payments, 
noting that he had accepted settlement in exchange for any m; 
of the six year comp,onsation to which he would have been entitl' 
Significantly, this Court said that the six year statute was on'l 
repose and that the Legislature intended the statute should be 
signed to terminate, not encourage, protraction of claims; o~~ 
wise, an employer would be an insurer for life. 
The other case is Kennecott Copper Corporation v. An~ 
30 U. 2d 102, 514 P. 2d 217. The claimant, employed in 1959,' 
tained major burns in an accident. He filed for compl'nsation ,. 
in January 1961 received a lump sum award for twenty percPnt li 
disability. In September 1962, he filed for further disabilit; 
and medicals and was awarded nine· (9) WPeks of add it ion,d tPnlL' 
- 6 -
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total. On October 23, 1968, nine years later, he again applied 
for additional compensation and medicals. This Court, on review, 
held that the six year limitation was applicable to compensation 
and disability awards but did not apply to medical and hospital 
expenses. The holding further noted that the six year statute 
in 35-1-66 would override the continuing jurisdiction statute, 
35-1-78, being more specific than the latter. 
Wilford Moore's weekly wage was $125.00. His initial 
award for permanent partial was $62.00 per week for 20 weeks, 
based on a finding of 10% disability. It is not apparent how this 
was arrived at. We surmise, however, that it was based on the maxi-
mum of $62.00 per week allowed by the statute at that time (Laws 
1967, Ch. 65). This totaled $1240.00. The award here in question 
was at the rate of $62.00 per week (presumably following the same 
scale because the statute now follows a different formula, Laws 1973 
Ch. 67) for 62.4 weeks for a total of $3868.80 less amounts paid. 
Moore's disability is now 20"/o so it is easy to see that 62.4 is 20"/o 
_ of the maximum of 312 weeks (or six years, depending on which amend-
ment you are looking at) • However, the original award was only for 
20 weeks so the Commission has now added 42.4 weeks for the addi-
tional 10"/o disability and we are dealing with the same injury. 
~at prompted the Commission to do this is not clear since there 
'·Jas no assertion that the first award was inadequate. We assumed 
- 7 -
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that it was proceeding under the continuing jurisdiction statute, 
35-l-78, and felt that the original 20 weeks was not enough. 
Plaintiff here asserts that such action apoears to it to be a~~ 
trary. However, without arguing arbitrariness, the subsequent 
award would still be barred by the statute of limitations. This 
Court observed in U.S. Smelting v. Nielsen, supra, that the statu 
awarding compensation for disability, 35-l-66, governs the fili119 
of supplemental claims for the recurrence of an injury. The con· 
tinuing jurisdiction statute, 35-l-78, does not create an except 
to the former, but merely provides that the Commission has cent' 
ing jurisdiction during the period that limitation is running. 
The Commission was, therefore, without jurisdiction to proceedw 
any event since the statute had run. 
CONCLUSION 
The award of the Commission made on March 29, 1977, sho 
be vacated and the application dismissed. 
- 8 -
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